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Rule of oil over the world’s economy will
eventually pass. For states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) in which hydrocarbons exports still
account for more than three quarters of total
government revenue, great changes loom on the
horizon. Moreover, while oil has propelled the
Gulf ’s economy for the greater part of the last half
century, overall demography of the GCC states
remains a setback: enormous surpluses of natural
resources are met by critical deficits of manpower
and skills in the scarcely populated Gulf.
Since the very beginning of oil extraction,
immigration has responded to imbalances between
capital and labour. But immigrants were never
naturalised and integrated into national populations.
As a result, foreign-nationals represent today 66.6
per cent of the total resident population in Kuwait
and proportions ranging from 37.9% (Saudi Arabia)
to 87.0% (United Arab Emirates) in other GCC
states.
GCC governments all consider that they
must free their countries from a double dependency,
on oil exports and labour imports. Part of their
strategy has focused on developing local human
capital and building knowledge-based economies (in
parallel with securing leading positions in the global
financial industry) in order to prepare for the post-
oil era. This particular economic and societal
transformation in the GCC and Kuwait presents
two key questions: 1) is local knowledge up to the
challenge? and 2) Will nationals or foreign-nationals
be the main holders of the needed knowledge?
These two key questions are discussed below with a
focus on the case of Kuwait.
The sheer magnitude of oil proceeds and
their continuous growth (despite vicissitudes in
Brent prices since their first major surge following
the October 1973 War) has made it possible for
GCC states to embark on unprecedented economic
modernisation. Development projects run by states
and private companies have been heavily reliant on
foreign workers, out of proportion to local human
resources, generating large-scale immigration of
labour and skills from outside the GCC. As shown
in Figure 1, the proportion of foreign-nationals
residing in GCC states has continuously increased
over the last fifty years (except in Kuwait where its
rise was temporarily interrupted by the Iraqi
invasion).
Two remarks must be made. First, Kuwait
distinguishes itself from the general trend. Its
spectacular rise as a magnet for migrant workers in
the early years of oil production in the Gulf was
suddenly interrupted in 1990 by the Iraqi invasion
of the country. Not only did the war trigger the
departure of hundreds of thousand foreigners
employed in the country. In addition, this war
changed the way in which Kuwaiti government
envisions foreign labour dependency, and the way
migrants regard Kuwait as a desirable destination to
work abroad. Hence, the presence of mutual
distrust reduced overall migration. Yet, a decade
later, the proportion of foreigners in the total GCC
population began to rise again.
Second, nationalisation policies adopted by
Kuwait and other GCC states’ since the 1990s to
replace foreign workers with local nationals have
failed to significantly curb immigration. Several
measures were taken to discourage the hiring of
foreign workers, such as tightening entry and exit
conditions for these employees, and creating tax
penalties for employers who hired foreigners.
Despite these measures, and in a context where the
private sector leads in job creation, private
employers continue to hire foreign workers as they
are ultimately cheaper and less demanding than
hiring a local national. Local nationals, and young
local national professionals in particular, continue to
turn towards public sector jobs as they are better
paid than the private sector. These factors have
resulted in a continuous proportional increase of
foreign-nationals in the labour force in Kuwait as
well as in all other GCC states.
Beyond figures, dependency of Gulf
economies on foreign labour should also be
understood in qualitative terms, looking at the
division of labour between nationals and foreign-
nationals. Figure 2 shows the clear-cut nationality
divide of the Kuwaiti labour markets (which does
not significantly differ from other GCC states in
this matter). Nationals who are active in the local
labour market are almost always employed in the
upper range of occupations. More specifically, 95%
of Kuwaiti male workers and 97% of female
Kuwaiti workers fall into one of the following
groups: legislators, senior officials & managers;
professionals; technicians & associates; and clerks.
In contrast, the majority of foreign-nationals (88%
of men and 72% of women) work in five groups at
the bottom of the ladder: service, shop & market
workers; skilled agricultural & fishery workers; craft
Figure 1: Percentage of foreign-nationals in the
resident population of GCC States 1975-2017
Source: GCC States’ statistical offices
and related trade workers; plant & machine
operators & assemblers; and primary occupations.
Nevertheless, foreigners at the top of the
ladder, despite being a minority among foreign
workers (12% of men and 29% of women), are a
majority among workers at the top of the
occupational ladder in the private sector, Kuwaitis
and non-Kuwaitis included. Encouraging nationals
to take up unskilled, low-paid jobs that are vital to
the local labour market is simply unrealistic.
Replacing high-skilled expats by nationals in the
private sector might also create serious challenges.
The oil economy served GCC populations
beyond the mere increase in households’ monetary
income. Rulers were keen to provide broad
wellbeing to their citizens, in particular through the
development of education. The rapid development
of schools at all levels ranging from pre-primary to
tertiary education has been remarkable across the
Gulf. It only took a few decades for Gulf nationals
to evolve from a largely illiterate population to one
with a large proportion of citizens (particularly
women) with tertiary education.
From the population register held by the
Public Authority for Civil Information – which
records all residents by age, sex, level of education
and nationality – one can draw a detailed picture of
the spread of university education in Kuwait over
the last half century. Administrative records make it
possible to capture the development of formal
education from one generation to the next through
various indicators. Fig. 3 provides the proportion of
people who completed tertiary education from
generations born in the early 1940s onwards.
The pattern shown by Kuwaiti nationals is
noteworthy, taking into consideration that the first
Kuwaiti university did not open before 1966. There
is also a remarkable proportion of university
graduates among Kuwaiti males as high as 15% for
those born in the early 1940s (reaching university
age in the late 1960s / early 1970s) and 25.2% 10
years later. Considering the patriarchal context of
Kuwait, it is even more noteworthy that, starting
from the generations born in the 1960s, more
women had attended university than men. The
proportion of university-educated women in
contrast to men, culminating at 34.7% for those
born in the late 1970s, is remarkable.
Following this uptick, a sudden change
happened. University enrolment of Kuwaiti men
started steadily declining from generations born in
the 1960s and onwards (this became the case later
on for women). These generations had reached
university age during difficult times: the oil crisis of
the late 1980s, followed by the 1990 Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait, and its strenuous consequences the
following decade. Conceivably, the progress of
tertiary education would pay the price for a
challenging post-war recovery. However, this
presents an important question: why has the
decrease in university enrolment continued until
more recent generations (individuals born in the
1990s who reached university age around the
2010s)?
Is it a consequence of smaller government
allocation for education in Kuwait compared to the
rest of the GCC (less than 10% of Kuwait’s budget
in contrast to the 15% average in other GCC
countries)? Or, is it that young people are not
sufficiently attracted by lengthy tertiary studies? A
quarter of Kuwaiti youth are unemployed, and the
prospects of university may not be encouraging for
ensuring a future stable career. Lastly, should one
consider the role of indirect demographic processes
that are of influence? For example, Kuwaiti
nationals who have a lower than average level of
education, yet some of the country’s highest birth
rates.
Figure 2: Percentage Distribution of
Employed Persons by Occupation, Nationality, and
Sex in Kuwait in 2015
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Kuwait, Labour Force
Survey 2015.
Note : Nationals and Non-Nationals are on two different
panels; on each panel and for each of males and females, two
levels of occupations are distinguished to which percentages
refer.
Source: Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI)
http://stat.paci.gov.kw/englishreports/#DataTabPlace:ColumnChartWorkAge
Figure 3: Proportion of individuals with a university degree
or more (ISCED5+) by generation, nationality and sex in
Kuwait (End of 2014)
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Regarding foreign-nationals, the pattern
displayed in Figure 3 is puzzling at first glance. The
proportion of university graduates culminates
among older migrants (born in the 1940s), then
begins to regularly decline from one generation to
the next. This counterintuitive trend (in migrants’
origin countries, young people are more educated
than older generations, and an increase in
educational level from one generation to the next
would be expected) reflects in reality two
particularities of labour migration to Kuwait (as
well as in the rest of the GCC).
First, low-skilled migrants (the greatest
demand present in Gulf labour markets) are
typically young individuals holding short-term
contracts. Once their contract expires, new
migrants replace departing ones at the same (low)
level of skills and education. The flat trend in the
proportion of university graduates observed from
generations born in the 1960s onwards reflects an
unchanged demand for low-skilled workers
(typically in the construction sector for men and
domestic services for women). Second, according
to Kuwaiti law, a certain level of income is required
for migrants to to have a right to family reunion.
Schematically, because living far away from family
is increasingly painful with the passing of time,
migrants without the right to bring their family
tend to depart earlier than those who are able to
have their family present. Older foreign-nationals
(e.g., individuals born in the 1940s and 1950s) have
on average lived in Kuwait long-term, and have the
mid to high level income (often linked with
university-level education) necessary to remain in-
country.
The challenge at hand for Kuwait (and other
smaller states of the GCC) is to transform a weak
demography into strong human capital. While
overall population in Kuwait is unlikely to reach an
extraordinary size, a higher level of education
combined with a powerful financial position could
provide a necessary basis for developing a
successful economy in the post-oil era. Oil may
have brought financial success to the region, but it
also simultaneously created several long-term
counter-effective outcomes.
With regard to higher education, oil
revenues made it possible to develop universities. It
also permitted Gulf nationals, through various
redistributive mechanisms (not covered in the
content of this paper), to stay out of the labour
market. Universities that had an impressive start in
Kuwait became stuck later on towards the end of
the last century, as displayed by a dramatic decline
in the proportion of graduates in subsequent
generations. This demonstrates the need for a
thorough diagnosis of how the higher-education
system in Kuwait has evolved since the beginnings
of its oil-based economy.
In order to build and expand human capital
amongst Kuwaiti nationals, two complementing
strategies seem suitable. First, establishing greater
links between universities and the labour market,
focusing on the quality of curricula and the
diploma’s value. In turn, these changes will create
greater efficiency in ensuring more and better paid
job opportunities for graduates, and making the
overall university experience more attractive for
younger generations. Second, providing foreign-
nationals with naturalisation opportunities, thus
allowing full integration of selected migrants
whose skills are greatly needed in the national
population.
